Abstract
AbstractStudies of investor responses to exchange offer (EO) announcements find a positive relation between abnormal returns and the proposed change in leverage: a result consistent with the performance signaling hypothesis. In this study of equity‐for‐debt EO announcements, shareholder wealth declines and the relation between Tobin's Q and announcement effects is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. There is no pattern of contemporaneous and subsequent performance of EO firms that systematically supports the signaling, income smoothing, or free cash flow hypotheses. We infer that EOs are motivated by sinking fund considerations, rather than signaling or compensation motives.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
