Abstract
We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an increasing equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values. In the case k ∈ { 0 , 1 } there exists a unique equilibrium in non-dominated strategies. Applying this equilibrium, we provide a detailed example illustrating how dependence level affects strategic bidding. In the case k ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) we prove existence of a continuum of strictly increasing equilibria, and illustrate them using an example. Furthermore, we show that equilibria in the case of independent private values are pointwise limits of equilibria with strictly affiliated private values.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
