Abstract
This is an applied study about the stability of collective decision-making in fiscal matters and the features of individual preferences which are sufficient to reach a social ordering. It is based on data about citizens' preferences collected through a budget game played by a sample of voters in Turin, a large Italian city. By simulating a series of individual choices, a social ordering of the municipal budget items is arrived at. The role played by restricted (i.e., single-peaked, single-caved etc.) preferences to avoid cycles in choice simulations is then assessed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
