Abstract
We prove the existence of pure strategy Bayesian equilibria in group contests under individual-level and group-level private information. For the latter type, we develop a novel approach reducing group contests to contests between individuals with multi-dimensional types, with far-reaching implications for the existence of equilibrium in various group contest settings, including the case of complete information.
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