Abstract
We consider equilibrium analysis of a single-server Markovian queueing system with working breakdowns. The system may become defective at any point of time when it is in operation. However, when the system is defective, instead of stopping service completely, the service continues at a slower rate. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure. With considering waiting cost and reward, the balking behavior of customers is investigated and the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategies are derived. The effects of the information level on the equilibrium behavior are illustrated further via numerical experiments.
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