Abstract
We consider a system of two unobservable Markovian queues in tandem with strategic customers, who are heterogeneous regarding their delay sensitivity. The customers decide upon arrival whether to balk or join the system and receive service in the first queue or in both queues. We analyze their equilibrium strategic behavior which is specified by double-threshold strategies regarding their delay sensitivity parameter (one threshold for each queue). Moreover, we compare the strategic behavior of the heterogeneous customer population with its homogeneous counterpart. We complement our theoretical results with numerical experiments and provide managerial insights into the optimal control of the system parameters.
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