Abstract

Chen et al. (2015) studied the equilibrium threshold balking strategies for the fully observable and fully unobservable single-server queues with threshold policy and setup times. The server shuts down whenever the system becomes empty, and is only resumed when the number of customers reaches to a given threshold. Customers decide whether to join or to balk the system based on their observations of the queue length and status of the server at arrival instants. This paper aims to study the partially observable case and the unobservable case. The stationary probability distribution, the mean queue length and the social welfare are derived. The equilibrium strategies for the customers and the system performance under these strategies are analyzed.

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