Abstract
There are two natural criteria a model-builder would like to prescribe to political parties in policy-making: either to maximize the mass of its supporters, or to minimize the dissatisfaction of its supporters with the policy of the party. In this paper the non-cooperative equilibria of such political systems is studied where the parties follow a convex combination of both of these criteria. The distribution of voters' political views is taken to be univariate, either uniform, or normal. The main conclusion is that by both distributions equilibria with non-coinciding policies exist if and only if the weight of vote maximization is strictly limited in policy-making.
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