Equality, Recognition and Social Justice: A Hegelian Perspective Announcing Amartya Sen

Abstract

The principle of formal equality refers to the basic idea that institutions shall have equal concern for all citizens and currently constitutes a requirement of justice. Amartya Sen (1992; 2009), for instance, suggests that equality is a necessary component of social justice theories if the requirement of impartiality is to be fulfilled. Analyzing the implications of such an idea, the paper argues that the concept of recognition is necessary to outline clearly why the process of implementation of equality requires institutional mediation. We call this “objective recognition,” which brings us to the limits of formal equality as applied to social justice, the aim of which is assumed to be actual freedom. The paper thus asserts that formal equality is a necessary but not sufficient condition of freedom. Relying on G.W.F. Hegel’s social theory and the post-Hegelian discussion of recognition theory, we argue that subjectivity also needs a space for its emancipation in the social sphere, exploring the dialectic between the universal and the particular that shows how the acknowledgement of identity and difference are separate processes, which must nevertheless stand together to provide the conditions of freedom. Hegel and Sen’s analyses converge on the subject of actual freedom and what makes it possible since both either assert or suggest that formal equality is necessary and raise the issue of acknowledging particularity through this dialectical approach: the paper thus aims to further our understanding of this dialectics and show how it applies to Sen’s conception of justice.