Abstract
Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin's account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.
Highlights
Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets
When Ronald Dworkin introduced his theory of equality of resources back in 1981, his first claim was that “an equal division of resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device and, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution” (Dworkin 2000, 66, my emphasis)
In a more recent article he says: “True equal concern requires ex ante, not ex post, equality” (Dworkin 2002, 124). This implies that people should be held responsible for how they approach risky choices as a fundamental feature of equality of resources, and it suggests that Dworkin would prefer to include risk in the model of the ideal market
Summary
Dworkin’s idea of equality of resources has many attractive features. It provides an interpretation and synthesis of two compelling principles: that it is important that each life goes well, and that persons are responsible for their ambitions. In a more recent article he says: “True equal concern requires ex ante, not ex post, equality” (Dworkin 2002, 124) This implies that people should be held responsible for how they approach risky choices as a fundamental feature of equality of resources, and it suggests that Dworkin would prefer to include risk in the model of the ideal market. Equality of commodities is both inegalitarian, since these differences in allocation do not depend on choice but on what we have chosen as the equalisandum of the theory of justice, and in violation of the demand that people should have a secure sense of what resources they will have available when planning their lives It would undermine Dworkin’s theory of equality to incorporate risk into the ideal of the market in this way. I submit that if Dworkin wants to use the ideal market as characterized in Debreu’s analysis, he is, or ought to be, committed to model the market on choices under certainty, and not under risk. I will draw out the implications of this certainty interpretation of Dworkin’s theory
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