Equality of Opportunity for Education: One-off or Lifelong?

This article reframes the approach to Rousseau in political philosophy and histories of political thought by emphasizing some neglected aesthetic dimensions of amour-propre and the general will. I argue that Rousseau's account of the origins of amour-propre in aesthetic judgment alerts us to his view that the potentially dangerous effects of amour-propre can be mitigated if its 'extension' to others is grounded in an aesthetic appreciation of beauty. This pushes back against the predominant 'revisionist' interpretation of amour-propre in terms of Hegelian 'recognition' or Rawlsian 'social bases of self-respect'. It also clears the ground for my recovery of Rousseau's neglected analogy between the general will and what he called the general taste. I argue that reconstructing the general taste and reconsidering the general will in its light yields a significant argument by analogy: like the general taste, the general will is democratically determined by majority vote, not constrained by transcendent standards.

This article covers the issue of policy development on adult learning in Mali, West Africa. On January 2007, the Malian government adopted a policy document termed Adult Non-formal Education Policy Document. The document was intended to regulate the adult learning sector and federate the actions of policy makers, adult education providers, and adult learners. The purpose of this article is to critically review the policy document, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. The article first depicts the context in which the policy was initiated and developed. Later on, it discusses the policy's effect on adult education practice, its limits, and its implication for the future of the field in Mali. Evolution of Adult Education in Mali: Why a Policy? Various terminologies are used to refer to the field of adult education such as literacy, andragogy, continuing education, non-formal education, popular education, adult education, lifelong education, and many more. Until the 1990s, some countries have rather stressed literacy, the acquisition of reading, writing, and numeracy skills. This activity was widespread in countries that had a very high rate of illiteracy. Meanwhile, other countries stressed continuing education through the skill development of working adults (Merriam & Brockett, 2007). The terminology of non-formal education was later used to refer to remedial educational opportunities beyond the formal school arena (Coombs & Ahmed, 1974). The concept of adult education stressing a larger dimension of learning opportunities for adults became popularized and internationalized through the UNESCO conference on adult education in 1976 (Torres, 1990). That definition was clarified further during the fifth edition of the International Conference on Adult Education (CONFINTEA) in 1997 to include all dimensions of learning opportunities for adults in all settings. CONFINTEA is the international adult education forum held by UNESCO every twelve years since 1949. As in many African countries, the concept of adult education is not widespread in Mali. The terminologies of literacy and non-formal education are often used when referring to adult education. The first literacy programs in Mali started in 1962, just a couple of years after the country got its independence (Ministry of Education and Literacy, 2007). From 1962 to 1990, literacy activities were carried out through several programs that were experimental and low in scale. Those programs related to the needs of the young country to undertake mass literacy initiatives. An important step was reached in the 1990s when the national context was influenced by the shift to democracy which saw the rapid growth of civil society organizations and their involvement in literacy. The same era was marked by UNESCO's Education For All conference in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990, setting an international agenda for adult education. The need for developing a policy document on adult learning became pressing in the year 2000. This movement was favored by both the national and international contexts. In the national arena, Mali moved to democracy and a decentralization era which called for reforms in several sectors including education. The Education Orientation Act and the Ten-Year Educational Development Program, both adopted in 1999 introduced the notion of adult nonformal education, which was supported by both technical and legislative organizations of adult education (African Platform for Adult Education, 2008; Doucoure & Diarra, 2006). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Documents adopted in 2002 and 2007 recognized the link between the low access to education among the population and poverty and the need to reorganize the adult learning sector (Ministry of Education and Literacy, 2008). The need for a policy to regulate adult learning was also inspired by the international agenda. Mali engaged in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the Educational For All (EFA) frameworks adopted by the United Nations and UNESCO in 2000, which, among other objectives, stressed the need for improved adult education opportunities. …

This article articulates and explores a localist conception of citizenship that stands in contrast to more liberal, neoliberal and cosmopolitan conceptions. A localist orientation, and some real sympathy, is evident in specifically ethnographic accounts of voters who supported Trump, Brexit and populism more broadly, including such accounts by Arlie Hochschild, Robert Wuthnow, Kathy Cramer and Justin Gest. This localist orientation echoes the Antifederalist opponents of the American Constitution, Jacksonian Democrats, Tocqueville’s account of American democracy and the American populists. I consider both the virtues and vices of localism. The possible benefits include local practices of nested reciprocity, special obligations, specifically local ‘social bases of selfrespect’ – in the terminology of John Rawls – and feelings of belonging and home (what the Germans call Heimat). However, localism also has its downsides: its resources can empower prejudice and exclusion. I end with a reflection on localism and exclusion in Lorraine Hasberry’s A Raisin in the Sun.

T r- HIS paper will argue that the roots and trunk of John Rawl's A Theory of Justice are more egalitarian than its branches. Specifically, Rawl's difference principle coheres relatively poorly with the more fundamental thrust of the theory's assumptions as to human and moral desirability. Particularly salient are the tensions between inequalities of income and wealth permissible under the operation of the difference principle in advanced industrial society on the one hand, and the basic values of political and equality thereof, the value of for all citizens, community or solidarity, the social bases of self-respect, opportunity, individual happiness and self-fulfillment, and the stability of a just society. The narrower question before us, then, is of the extent to which inequalities of wealth and income are compatible with optimizing these latter more basic values. Rawls' difference principle of course includes consideration of the social bases of self-respect, so it is the possible tensions between equality and the social bases of self-respect and inequalities in other primary social goods (e.g., income and wealth, opportunities and powers, etc.) also subsumed under the difference principle that concern us. The difference principle also assumes that the background conditions of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity obtain. This feature, however, does not disarm egalitarian criticism of the theory. It simply means that it must become the task of the definitive egalitarian critique to show, through empirical evidence and conceptual analysis, that departures from equality of income and wealth lead, at least under certain conditions, to violations of lexically higher principles or other desirable social values relevant to distributive justice. Given the constraints of space and data availability, the present paper will proceed by way of intimation and suggestion rather than through the marshaling of the requisite evidence and analysis. The essentials of the difference principle are by now well known. The underlying idea is that the contingencies of nature and fortune are to be treated as a common asset and placed at the service of the interests of the entire society, and particularly the least advantaged members of the society. The latter may appropriately denounce any distribution of primary social goods as unjust if they would benefit in absolute terms from a more egalitarian distribution.1 This feature of the theory indicates the difference in approach between Rawls' theory and traditional utilitarian and strict egalitarian conceptions. We can draw from this formulation that which Rawls acknowledges: the difference principle might permit wide and increasing divergence in both directions from an average income. But more important for a broad-based egalitarian critique, we must recognize that Rawls' formulation is prima facie well adapted to withstand egalitarian criticism. The egalitarian must be prepared to maintain the not obviously appealing view that such distributions of primary social goods, or of income and wealth specifically, among representative persons as five units and five units, or five units and six units, are preferable from the standpoint of

Health in a just society

Adult education as a field has long espoused ideals of equity in educational opportunity. In recent years, there has been considerable debate regarding the degree to which our practice lives up to these espoused ideals. This debate has been reflected in a growing literature addressing issues of race, ethnicity, and gender as they relate to adult education practice, research, and theory development. Yet, surprisingly, this debate has rarely included attention to disabilities as a dimension of equity. An interest in the relationships among disability, adult learning, and adult education practice has been reflected, albeit modestly reflected, in adult education literature dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (Travis, 1979; Ross-Gordon, 1989). During the 1990s several book-length discussions of adults with disabilities with the adult educator as the intended audience emerged (Gadbow and Dubois, 1998; Vogel and Reder, 1998; Jordan, 1998). Recently books on disabilities that adult educators would also find useful have emerged from other fields, particularly the fields of learning disabilities and disability studies, (Albrecht, Seelman, & Bury, 2001; Gerber & Reiff, 1995; Gregg, Hoy, & Gay, 1996; Linton, 1998; Marks, 1999). In addition to concerns for equity, an awareness of the relationships between adult learning and disabilities is important from a legal perspective as we become increasingly cognizant of the implications of the Americans with Disabilities Act for adult education practice. This issue of Adult Learning is an attempt to bring disabilities to the forefront as a concern for those planning programs for adult learners across a spectrum of settings. The articles included represent some of the common settings for adult education, and particularly those settings where educators have already devoted some attention to disabilities. Adult Basic Education and GED preparation programs are the focal point for the articles by Poison and White and Sturomski and Auchter. Gadbow, Goss and Rocco have contributed articles that will have the greatest applicability to higher education settings. For those interested in discussions with relevance to the workplace, the articles by Gadbow and Rocco should be of interest. The article least tied to a particular context of adult education practice is that of Plotts. Aside from the practice setting, another way to view the organization of this issue is in terms of three themes represented by the six articles. While they take different approaches, Gloss and Plotts' articles deal with having a disability that may affect one's efforts as an adult learner. Reading these first may help the reader understand Rocco's discussion of disclosure of disability and how the decision of disclosing a disability is an individual choice that must be revisited with every new educational opportunity. Finally, several of the articles deal with what AL readers may be most interested to discover--ways to accommodate the needs of adults with disabilities when making instructional and assessment decisions. Plotts and Gloss focus on what it is like to have a disability that affects one's efforts as an adult learner. Plotts presents the perspective of the diagnostic expert on what it means to have one of three categories of disability which adult educations encounter with some frequency and confusion: Learning disabilities (ED), attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). She provides a succinct overview of the frameworks that serve as the basis for diagnosing these disabilities, as well as the legislative bases that necessitate appropriate accommodations for these disabilities across educational environments. She next describes the manifestations of each of these disabilities as they may be observed in the classroom or training setting, noting that while they may co-exist and even share certain indicators, they are each distinct in their characteristics. …

Formal adult education (FAE) has become a frequently used category within cross-country comparative research on adult learning. It refers to adults returning to a qualification-awarding education offer involving at least the equivalent of half a year of full-time education. As an umbrella term, it captures rather different fields including adult basic education, second chance education, higher education for mature students, VET and retraining for adults, formal corporate training programs, continuing higher education, and continuing professional education. Beginning with a historic account of the concept, the chapter explores the common core of FAE, how it differs from non-formal adult education, and introduces data collected and different types of FAE. In essence, FAE is an often-neglected part of the education system characterized by its promise to support adult participants’ social upwards mobility. FAE is thereby necessarily tainted by education’s ambivalent role within social stratification and imprinted with the social conflicts waged about purpose and equity of education. Moreover, six decades of educational expansion have made it even more essential to design policies that allow FAE to deliver what participants are encouraged to expect in return for their continuing educational efforts.

Formal adult education (FAE) has become a frequently used category within cross-country comparative research on adult learning. It refers to adults returning to a qualification-awarding education offer involving at least the equivalent of half a year of full-time education. As an umbrella term, it captures rather different fields including adult basic education, second chance education, higher education for mature students, VET and retraining for adults, formal corporate training programs, continuing higher education, and continuing professional education. Beginning with a historic account of the concept, the chapter explores the common core of FAE, how it differs from non-formal adult education, and introduces data collected and different types of FAE. In essence, FAE is an often-neglected part of the education system characterized by its promise to support adult participants’ social upwards mobility. FAE is thereby necessarily tainted by education’s ambivalent role within social stratification and imprinted with the social conflicts waged about purpose and equity of education. Moreover, six decades of educational expansion have made it even more essential to design policies that allow FAE to deliver what participants are encouraged to expect in return for their continuing educational efforts.KeywordsAdult learningFormal adult educationSocial stratificationEducation as an institutionSocial charterSecond chance educationWork-to-school transitionsRecurrent education

This paper discusses Rawls’s thesis that the social basis of self-respect is one of the primary social goods. While the central element of the social basis consists in the attitudes of others (e.g. respect or esteem) the social basis may include also possession of various goods. Further, one may distinguish, following Honneth, universalistic basic respect from differential esteem and from loving care. This paper focuses on esteem, and further distinguishes three important varieties thereof (anti-stigmatization; contributions to societal goods, projects of self-realization), which all differ from recognition of cultural identity. The normative implications will differ in these different contexts.

This article argues that economic crises are incompatible with the realisation of non-domination in capitalist societies. The ineradicable risk that an economic crisis will occur undermines the robust security of the conditions of non-domination for all citizens, not only those who are harmed by a crisis. I begin by demonstrating that the unemployment caused by economic crises violates the egalitarian dimensions of freedom as non-domination. The lack of employment constitutes an exclusion from the social bases of self-respect, and from a practice of mutual social contribution crucial to the intersubjective affirmation of one’s status. While this argument shows that republicans must be concerned about economic crises, I suggest a more powerful argument can be grounded in the republican requirement that freedom must be robust. The systemic risk of economic crisis constitutes a threat to the conditions of free citizenship that cannot be nullified using policy mechanisms. As a result, republicans appear to be faced with the choice of revising their commitments or rejecting the possibility that republican freedom can be robustly secured in capitalist societies.

This paper investigates the limitations of the ideal of political equality under non-ideal circumstances and focuses specifically on the way in which structurally unjust social contexts endanger individuals’ perception of their own worth. Starting from Rawls’ definition of the social bases of self-respect as a primary good to be fairly distributed, the paper main goal is to provide normative arguments in favor of a power sensitive theory of political agency. A power sensitive theory, in fact, proves to be necessary as it sheds a light over the way in which power relationships affect the very possibility, for some members of the constituency, of fully enjoying the status of political reflexive agents. Against this background, in the paper I defend two main theses. First, I argue that the contemporary debate concerning the implementation of the ideal of equality within liberal democracies has been overlooking the epistemic dimension of the basis of political equality. Second, I claim that specifying the epistemic dimension of political equality has at least two important effects. a. It is important from the perspective of conceptual analysis, as it allows to properly distinguish between the normative job played by moral arguments on the one hand, and the epistemic aspects of political equality on the other hand. b. The specification of the epistemic aspects of political equality has at least on important normative upshot, namely the possibility to show that epistemic forms of injustice are detrimental to the very ideal of political equality as an essential feature of liberal conceptions of democracy.

In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups deserve special attention, care or protection. One can define vulnerable persons as those having a greater likelihood of being wronged - that is, of being denied adequate satisfaction of certain legitimate claims. The conjunction of these two points entails what we call the Special Protection Thesis. It asserts that persons with a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of their legitimate claims deserve special attention, care or protection. Such a thesis remains vague, however, as long as we do not know what legitimate claims are. This article aims at dispelling this vagueness by exploring what claims we have in relation to health care - thus fleshing out a claim-based conception of vulnerability. We argue that the Special Protection Thesis must be enriched as follows: If individual or group X has a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of some of their legitimate claims to (i) physical integrity, (ii) autonomy, (iii) freedom, (iv) social provision, (v) impartial quality of government, (vi) social bases of self-respect or (vii) communal belonging, then X deserves special attention, care or protection. With this improved understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability talk in healthcare ethics can escape vagueness and serve as an adequate basis for practice.

The difference principle as agreed in the original position, offers a way of seeing nature and the social world as no longer hostile to democratic equality. (JAFR: 76) In this chapter, I present the second part of Rawls' argument: the reasoning that leads to adopting the two principles of justice as fairness and to rejecting the other alternatives, mainly the utility principle in its various forms. As important as the reasoning itself is its setting in an Original Position (OP hereafter) where the parties, placed behind a “veil of ignorance”, reflect on how best to distribute “primary goods” among the persons they represent, goods that are not simply welfare, but include wealth and income as well as the basic liberties and the social bases of self-respect ( TJ : 54–5). How can such a constraint on information lead to rational and effective arguments? Many critics have argued that the theory of justice would be more convincing without the cumbersome device of the OP that hides and even undermines Rawls' deepcommitment, beyond the metaphor of the social contract, to public justification and the ideal of equal respect. Conversely, some, such as David Gauthier, have claimed that the OP fails to exploit fully the resources of rational choice theory for deriving principles of justice from principles of rationality. The aim of this chapter is to explain why, in spite of widespread criticisms, OP arguments still constitute the heart of the doctrine, even if they are complemented by independent arguments and have been of ten misunderstood.

This article addresses Rawls´s critique of utilitarianism in the framework of the discussion on the moral foundation of the principles of justice. It is shown the principle of utility lacks the necessary moral constraints that ensure both effective recognition among people and a fair distribution of the social bases of self-respect. Rawls's arguments against classical utilitarianism fall into two groups: first those who are independent of the contractual dimension of his theory, then those that are the result of the original position and the veil of ignorance. It is concluded that, given the relevance of the mutual recognition and self-respect for the establishment of a just society, the principle of utility cannot be a moral alternative for the organisation of the main social institutions

This introduction offers a concise overview of the book. It outlines the three chapters of Seana Shiffrin’s core text; offers brief summaries of the three commentaries by Niko Kolodny, Richard R. W. Brooks, and Anna Stilz; and highlights some key points from Shiffrin’s extensive replies. It emphasizes two of the pretheoretical assumptions motivating Shiffrin’s argument for the communicative character of democratic law: that democracy is not defined in terms of elections and that both democracy and law must be conceived as a means for fulfilling moral obligations. It also emphasizes the Rawlsian background to Shiffrin’s argument, in particular the idea that justice requires that we realize for one another the social bases of self-respect. Finally, it underscores the timeliness of Shiffrin’s account in the light of widely recognized threats to democracy in the United States and elsewhere.