Equality and Moral Worth in Natural-Law Ethics and Beyond

Abstract

Many ethicists see equality as (a) a basic value, (b) a basic moral norm, or (c) a fact about persons underlying moral rights. Some thinkers have argued against (a) and (b). Here I apply and extend their insights. I apply them to a tradition that has long given equality a fundamental role: the broadly Aristotelian or natural-law tradition stretching from classical Greece through Aquinas to contemporary thinkers like John Finnis (on whose well-worked out account I focus). And I extend these insights by questioning (c): Not only is equality not a basic value or a basic moral norm; but the claim often said to ground moral rights—that all persons are equal in moral worth or status—is empty and potentially misleading given natural-law as well as many non-consequentialist views of personhood. I end by considering how equality talk can still remind us of important moral truths about deliberation.