Equal opportunities and the use of language: A critique of the new orthodoxy

Abstract

ABSTRACT The proliferation of equal opportunities policies in institutions of higher education in recent years has resulted in a number of institutions introducing policies which aim to regulate the use of language. Our aim, in this paper, is to explore the philosophical foundations of such policies, and to pose the question of whether they can be justified on the grounds that they promote equality of opportunity. In the first part of the paper, we examine various conceptions of equality of opportunity, and advance the argument that this is best understood as the avoidance of unfair discrimination, or in other words as a form of procedural justice. In the second we consider the claim, advanced by various feminist linguists and philosophers, that the use of certain words can lead to unfair discrimination. Our conclusion is that such views are based on untenable theories of meaning, and therefore that policies aiming to regulate the use of language are impossible to defend.