EPR system participants’ behavior: Evolutionary game and strategy simulation

Abstract

Promoting the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system in an all-round way has become an essential part of China’s environmental regulations. A tripartite game model among the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) department, producers and the public is constructed based on the non-cooperative evolutionary game theory. Then this paper uses a system dynamics method to simulate and analyze the proposed game model. It is found that benefits of “strict regulation” strategy and financial subsidies subsidized by a superior EPB help to ease behavioral conflicts among game players, but their positive moderating impacts are scant. Effects of administrative fines and rectification due to the “relaxed regulation” strategy are unpredictable, such that the principle of moderation must be taken into account when rewarding or punishing an inferior EPB. As far as the producer is concerned, policy compensation paid by the EPB department has a positive effect on easing conflicts, but the impact of administrative penalties exerted on the producer who violates EPR system behind the scenes is negative. The profit-making characteristic of producers makes the influence of EPR system acceptance cost uncertain, which also implies that a suitable policy system is beneficial to changing producers’ natural resistance to the EPR system. Noteworthy, effects of all the three factors on producers are lagging behind. Last but not least, under the premise of different environmental regulations, the public’s expectations of environmental protection play exactly the opposite role. This study provides detailed and enlightening suggestions to different countries for constructing a comprehensive EPR policy system.