Abstract
Abstract Far from considering the phenomenon of disagreement across the board, the peer debate in epistemology solely focuses on cases of disagreements that are at least assumed to be genuine. What counts as a genuine disagreement is most of the times kept on the level of a pre-theoretical intuition according to which the peers disagree insofar as they hold incompatible doxastic attitudes with respect to a proposition P (King, 2012). Yet, the pre-theoretical intuition yields the wrong verdict when the bone of contention is a proposition whose truth is relativized. In order to avoid these counter-intuitive results, the peer debate needs to replace the pre-theoretical intuition of genuine disagreement with a full-fledged account of it. In this essay I firstly put forth a possible candidate for the role coming from an ongoing discussion in philosophy of language. Then, I assess how well such an account fares in both an outright and a credal model of belief.
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