Epistemology Naturalized: Quine's Intervention in the Debate Concerning the Problem of Knowledge

Abstract

The present paper attempts critical navigation of what could be referred to as the Quinean Intervention in the debate concerning the problem of knowledge. This problem easily represents the central concern of traditional epistemology, particularly since the modern period. Its retrospective statement finds expression in the ancient definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Among the problems easily identified with the traditional conception of knowledge is the problem of exhaustive or conclusive justification, which is to form the base of the structure of knowledge. Philosophers across the spectrum of discourse have risen to respond to the problem. Prominent among the position is foundationalism and coherentism as theories of justification. However, these theoretical representations are never able to proffer conclusive justification condition; and so, the traditional problem of epistemology has remained largely unresolved. Several alternatives have therefore been proffered by philosophers across the board. One of such is the project to naturalize epistemology – a programme famously identified with W.V.O. Quine. The paper examines Quine's position to move epistemology from philosophy to psychology. This project, the paper argues, stripped epistemology of its normative status, and therefore cannot be regarded as a philosophical proposal, as philosophy is essentially prescriptive not descriptive, matters of ought not matters of is or matters of values not matters of fact. For this reason, the paper rejects the Quinean project, describing it as a non-epistemic response to an epistemological problem. The paper employs the philosophical method of analysis, clarification and criticism, combining this with the method of reconstruction and clarity.