Abstract
Abstract The cosmological argument— the argument from contingency to the existence of a necessary First Cause— forms the core of a long-standing research programme in philosophical theology. Even if such theistic arguments are, as Plantinga has demonstrated, unnecessary for the reasonableness of theistic belief, a successful proof would by all accounts have considerable significance. The cosmological argument has in recent years garnered considerable respect, both from theists and agnostics. However, the central assumption of that argument, a principle of sufficient reason or general causation, has failed to win universal acceptance. A recent book by Alexander Pruss (2006a), The Principle of Sufficient Reason, has addressed this question with a number of ingenious appeals to our metaphysical intuitions. In this paper, I will attempt to complement Pruss’s efforts through an appeal to epistemology.
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