Abstract

In “Epistemological Duties,” Richard Feldman uses three main questions to illuminate the topic of epistemological duties. (1) What are our epistemological duties? After suggesting that epistemological duties pertain to the development of appropriate cognitive attitudes, Feldman asks (2) What makes a duty epistemological? and (3) How do epistemological duties interact with other kinds of duties? His pursuit of (3) contributes to his response to (2) in that he uses it to argue that a concept of distinctly epistemological duty must exclude practical and moral duties that pertain to belief, and include only duties that pertain to epistemological success (the act of having reasonable or justified cognitive attitudes).

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