Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical Skepticism

Abstract

This chapter explains that the Achilles' heel of epistemological disjunctivism as an anti-skeptical strategy lies in the response that it offers to the closureRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, whereas the epistemological disjunctivist's claim that one can possess a rational grounding for one's everyday beliefs that favors those beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives is well motivated, such that epistemological disjunctivism can evade the problem posed by underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism, a stronger epistemological thesis is required to deal with closureRK-based radical skepticism, and this thesis is not well motivated. In particular, what is required is the idea that one can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, and such a claim appears epistemically immodest in the extreme.