Episteminis pagrįstumas (Internalizmo ir eksternalizmo polemika)

Abstract

The article features one of the main discussions in contemporary Anglo-American epistemology regarding the nature of epistemic justification.The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of internalist conception, emphasizing its normative deontologi-cal nature, which is closely connected to the claim that belief-justifying reasons should be accessible to the cognizer upon reflecting on the contents of her mind. The second part of the article investigates the externalist critiąue of the traditional concept of justi-fication as well as its own project to treat justification as a product of reliable belief-forming processes, which are not within the immediate reflective reach to the subject. By virtue of this change in focus the concept of justification experiences essential changes that conseąuently influence the concept of knowledge. Justification is now interpreted not as an internal procedure of monitoring one's mind and finding good belief-justifying reasons but instead as an enterprise recognizing the impact of cogni-tive and sočiai factors for justification of belief. This is considered to be an important merit of this account, since it helps to formulate more realistic and full-blooded account of knowledge.