Abstract
For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically—a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the causes of peer disagreement bear on the debate’s core philosophical issue. Part of our argument for this thesis will involve giving a thorough yet entirely informal presentation of mathematical theorems in economics by Robert Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239,1976) and Polemarchakis and Geneakoplos (J Econ Theory 26:363–390,1982) which represent a formally precise description of how two rational agents must deal with disagreement under certain epistemically interesting circumstances.
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