Abstract
A number of philosophers, notably Carl G. Hempel, Isaac Levi, Jaakko Hintikka, Risto Hilpinen, and Juhani Pietarinen, have recently suggested that many important aspects of scientific inference can be conceptualized in decision-theoretic terms.1 In particular, it has been suggested that the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses can be viewed as a process of maximatization of certain epistemic utilities that are related to the cognitive objectives of the scientist qua scientist. Such epistemic utilities include truth, information, systematic or explanatory power, and simplicity.
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