Abstract
There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to (all) others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. No-metajustification is commonly taken to deny the objectivity of standards. In this paper I shall discuss two currently popular attempts to attack “No-metajustification”. The first attempt attacks no-metajustification by challenging a particular strategy of arguing in its defence: this strategy involves the ancient Pyrrhonian “Problem of the Criterion”. The second attempt to refute No-metajustification targets its metaphysical underpinning: to wit, the claim that there are, or could be, several fundamentally different and irreconcilable epistemic systems. I shall call this assumption “Pluralism”. I shall address three questions with respect to these attempts to refute epistemic relativism by attacking no-metajustification: (i) Can the epistemic relativist rely on the Problem of the Criterion in support of No-metajustification? (ii) Is a combination of Chisholmian “particularism” (i.e. the insistence that we know lots of things) and epistemic naturalism an effective weapon against No-metajustification? And (iii) is Pluralism a defensible assumption?
Highlights
There are a number of debates that are relevant for reflections on objectivity in science
All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others
A naturalistic testing of epistemic norms might well lead us back to epistemic relativism
Summary
There are a number of debates that are relevant for reflections on objectivity in science. Many philosophers think that if epistemic relativism is right there is less to the objectivity of science than we commonly assume. Instead it will seek to contribute to the question whether epistemic relativism is a defensible position. No-metajustification is commonly taken to deny the objectivity of epistemic standards. In this paper I shall discuss two currently popular attempts to attack “No-metajustification”. The second attempt to refute No-metajustification targets its metaphysical underpinnings: to wit, the claim that there are, or could be, fundamentally different and irreconcilable epistemic systems. Following Paul Boghossian I shall dub this assumption “Pluralism” I shall address three questions with respect to these attempts to refute epistemic relativism by attacking No-metajustification: (i) Can the epistemic relativist rely on the Problem of the Criterion in support of No-metajustification? I begin with my first key question, to wit, the question whether the epistemic relativist can use the Problem of the Criterion to make her case
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