Abstract

Reductionist views are the least radical of the antirealist camp. They maintain that there are moral facts, but deny that these facts are or generate categorical reasons. This chapter develops the epistemic counterpart to this view. It argues that while more plausible than more radical antirealist views, epistemic reductionism is incompatible with both externalist and internalist accounts of epistemic justification, and yields an unattractive version of epistemic relativism. These are important reasons for not accepting it.

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