Epistemic Proceduralism Defended II

Abstract

AbstractEpistemic proceduralism is spelled out by clusters of principles characterizing the structure, function, and logic of procedural epistemic norms, norms that define restrictions on epistemic actions, processes, and procedures. With the content of epistemic norms regimented by means of norm-kernels and restrictions on epistemic dynamics, this chapter completes the defense of epistemic proceduralism. It articulates and defends the cluster, D3, along with its subclauses and corollaries, D3C1, D3C2, and D3C3. Roughly, this cluster of principles identifies the core forms of reasoning with and about epistemic rationality norms required by their first-order use in deliberate, ante hoc regulation (i.e., epistemic planning and control) and by their second-order use as objects of epistemological and logical analysis. Reasoning about norm equivalence, dependence, and independence relations as well as interactions between these logical properties and their normative verdicts prove to be of central importance, as does reasoning about their connections to deontic operators and the logical decomposition of ante hoc regulation. In the context of the book, the clusters of principles articulating these results stand as theoretical criteria or tests applicable to formal frameworks for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms. The chapter closes with two exercises helpful for framing the rest of the book. The first is a pair of brief arguments for the claim that the clusters of principles, D1–D3C3, are criteria on formal frameworks for the logic of epistemic norms. The second is an application of D1-D3C3 to other formal frameworks, which serves to highlight the main ideas of PLEN by contrast.