Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem

J Adam Carter

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x

Abstract

A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill (what I call generative emotional skill and doxastic emotional skill) and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first negative and the second positive. The negative part criticises the epistemic credentials of Epistemic Perceptualism (e.g., Tappolet, in: Clotilde (ed) Perceptual illusions. Philosophical and psychological essays, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012; Tappolet in Emotions, value, and agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Döring in The Philos Quart 53(211): 214–230, 2003; Döring in Dialectica 61(3): 363–394, 2007; Elgin, in: Georg, Kunzle (eds) Epistemology and emotions, Ashgate Alderchot, Farnham, 2008; Roberts in Emotions: an essay in aid of moral psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), the view that emotional experience alone suffices to prima facie justify evaluative beliefs in a way that is analogous to how perceptual experience justifies our beliefs about the external world. The second part of the paper develops an account of emotional skill and uses this account to frame a revisionary form of Epistemic Perceptualism that succeeds where the traditional views could not. I conclude by considering some objections and replies.

Highlights

A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress
It is claimed that emotions play epistemic roles that are analogous to those played by sensory perceptual experience
Tappolet remarks that: The claim that emotions constitute defeasible reasons for our evaluative beliefs fits well with a foundationalist account of justification according to which epistemic justification depends on a number of beliefs whose justification is independent of other beliefs (2016, p. 168)

Summary

Introduction

A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Let’s consider how we might spell out in a substantive way the kind of epistemic credentials emotions would have to have in order to be the sort of things that suffice to prima facie justify beliefs.

Results

Conclusion