Abstract
Abstract This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as active ignoring, and the use of ignorance as resistance to oppression. In addition, this chapter questions whether the frame of ignorance continues to be helpful for resisting epistemic oppression and considers an alternative frame for tracking the infringements on epistemic agency and autonomy highlighted in the literature on ignorance.
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