Abstract
Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.
Highlights
B Mona SimionSynthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 15):S3553–S3564 radically deceived,’ ‘There is an external world’ etc., phenomenologically very similar to beliefs, are non-doxastic propositional attitudes, i.e. mere ‘commitments.’
There’s a new kid on the hinge epistemology block: the No-Belief view.1 No-Belief claims that our propositional attitudes towards hinge propositions,2 such as ‘I’m not B Mona Simion S3554Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 15):S3553–S3564 radically deceived,’ ‘There is an external world’ etc., phenomenologically very similar to beliefs, are non-doxastic propositional attitudes, i.e. mere ‘commitments.’This theory entails substantial fallibility in our self-ascription of attitudes: the propositions classified as hinges are ones many of us take ourselves to believe
Very roughly, according to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by an epistemic norm
Summary
Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 15):S3553–S3564 radically deceived,’ ‘There is an external world’ etc., phenomenologically very similar to beliefs, are non-doxastic propositional attitudes, i.e. mere ‘commitments.’. This theory entails substantial fallibility in our self-ascription of attitudes: the propositions classified as hinges are ones many of us take ourselves to believe. One important novel contribution this paper is making is bringing three debates together, i.e. debates about the norm of belief, the nature of belief and debates in hinge epistemology To this effect, in order to achieve the appropriate degree of generality, we will restrict our focus to foundational hinge propositions that widely recognised as such by hinge literature, i.e. what is commonly referred to as ‘uber-hinges’ (such as ‘I am not radically deceived,’ ‘The external world exists’). We end on a pessimistic note concerning both Pritchard’s version of the view, and, more generally, the prospects for this approach to hinge epistemology
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