Epistemic motives moderate the effect of metaphoric framing on attitudes

Abstract

People frequently encounter messages framing abstract sociopolitical issues (e.g., drug law enforcement) metaphorically in terms of superficially unrelated, more concrete concepts (e.g., military combat). These metaphoric framings are not mere figures of speech; instead, they prompt observers to interpret the target issue using their knowledge of the concrete concept, despite their surface differences. In this paper we examine how this effect is moderated by observers' motivation to think about the target issue. Integrating conceptual metaphor and lay epistemology theories, we propose that metaphor can satisfy three epistemic motives: to be certain, consistent, and accurate. Studies 1a–b provide preliminary evidence that participants exposed to a metaphoric framing transfer knowledge of a concrete concept (vehicle operation) to interpret a target issue (system failure). Studies 2 to 4 show that this effect holds only when the metaphoric framing serves an epistemic motive. Findings illuminate when and why people rely on metaphor to think.