Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces

Abstract

In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers (see Aumann and Brandenburger in Econometrica 36:1161–1180, 1995; Baltag et al. in Synthese 169:301–333, 2009; Battigalli and Bonanno in Res Econ 53(2):149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42(6):863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided. Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge and the logic STIT (the logic of “seeing to it that”) by Belnap and colleagues (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world, 2001).