Epistemic Injustice and Mental Illness

Abstract

This chapter focuses on epistemic injustices that can take place in the context of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. It argues people diagnosed with mental illnesses are often stereotyped in such a way as to deflate their credibility, and that the authoritative and even exclusive status accorded to third-person, medical perspectives on experiences of mental illness leads to hermeneutical marginalization and silencing. The chapter takes as its starting-point the idea that epistemic injustice can be countered by recognition of the ways in which the marginalized person is in fact epistemically privileged. It also argues that recognizing the ways in which people diagnosed with mental illnesses have access to distinctive and/or unique forms of knowledge can correct our testimonial sensibilities and provide us with new hermeneutical resources, and is therefore a route to epistemic justice. The chapter explores ways in which this might be the case in relation to experiences of mental illness.