Abstract
In this chapter, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that this notion is expected to capture various aspects that are not easily unified: while some aspects are more about the agent in a certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, incompatible intuitions emerge about the transparency of epistemic dilemmas and about the role doxastic suspension may play in resolving dilemmic cases. I suggest a distinction between the mental state of agents who find themselves in an epistemic dilemma and the normative situation that gives rise to a dilemma. I will refer to the agent’s mental state as “epistemic conflict” and will reserve the term “epistemic dilemma” for evidential situations in which epistemic principles either recommend incompatible doxastic responses or render all options impermissible. The concept of epistemic conflict also applies to agents who face difficult epistemic choices that they cannot resolve without substantial mental effort, for example, via doxastic suspension.
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