Epistemic desiderata and religious plurality

Abstract

There are philosophical arguments to the effect that the epistemic consequences of religious plurality threaten the epistemic status of religious beliefs. What is not clear is the sense in which they might do so: what epistemological categories are at issue? This chapter uses William Alston’s epistemic-desiderata approach as a guide to the different epistemic values that can be affected by religious plurality. The author argues that in none of Alston’s five categories does religious plurality destroy the positive epistemic status of religious belief, though it can make the realization of many desiderata much more difficult. The chapter concludes with three methodological remarks. First: The situation of religious plurality favours some epistemological positions over others. Second: The philosophy of religion should not ignore individual religious traditions and particular religious doctrines. Third: Religious plurality reminds us that real religions are much more complicated and intricate phenomena than analytic philosophers often admit.