Abstract
It is not uncommon in our experience that epistemic and practical interests conflict. It often happens that it is not possible to pursue the ones and the others at the same time and that we must make a choice. This also occurs in institutional settings such as the legal one. I make the example of a US procedural rule (Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that sacrifices some epistemic interests in favor of practical interests. What remains more controversial is what philosophical consequences can be drawn from these considerations, and I try to discuss their nature and scope.
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