Environmental politics and the changing context of interest group organization

Abstract

Olson's seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action, holds that rational choice militates against the formation or at least success of collective interests unless such groups offer sufficient selective benefits. A number of scholars, however, have come to argue that changes in the very nature of interest groups, their patterns of organization, and their funding have rendered aspects of Olson's model obsolete. This study attempts to provide empirical support for Olson's critics by examining a case of interest group mobilization and organization involving the extremely polarized policy conflict over old growth forests in Oregon's Siskiyou National Forest. What this study found in this case was that: (1) environmental interests still managed to readily and vigorously organize into manifest groups, (2) the existence of patron-funding and coalition groups undermined the ability of selective incentives to account for such organization, and (3) the very modest incentives that environmental groups offered do not adequately explain the degree and depth of this organization. This study speculates that the pluralist idea of a shared perception of common interests and/or threats offers a more persuasive explanation for group organization in the politics of the Siskiyou.