Environmental governance as a new runway of promotion tournaments: campaign-style governance and policy implementation in China's environmental laws.

Abstract

The inefficient enforcement of environmental policies cannot address global environmental challenges. As a result, China's government has implemented the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI) to overcome the policy-implementation gap between higher and lower levels of government. The existing literature has examined the positive effects of CEPI on environmental pollution, but has not explained the mechanisms for its success. To examine these mechanisms, this article uses a series of regression analyses on an empirical data set of 282 prefecture-level cities from 2010 to 2018. The results identify the mechanism for the effective implementation of CEPI, from the perspective of the campaign-style governance of local officials at local levels. This study also shows the heterogeneity of the campaign-style governance behavior of local officials, including position types and professional and cultural backgrounds. And finally, this study demonstrates that the campaign-style governance behavior of local officials has a moderating effect on the relationship between environmental pollution and local officials' promotion. Ultimately the article proposes that higher government levels should adopt the effective incentives policy to address gaps between environmental policy and implementation.