ENVIRONMENTAL BELIEF SYSTEMS: EMPIRICAL STRUCTURE AND A TYPOLOGY

Abstract

Introduction A person (re)constructs his or her environmental mentality in a particular sociocultural context. This context is manifested in public discourses, cultural models and meaning complexes that all provide explicit and implicit suggestions (Valsiner 1998) for an individual. Environmental beliefs are subjective theories about the human-nature relationship that form a conceptual basis for more specific attitudes, beliefs and behaviors towards the environment. On the one hand, environmental beliefs are embedded in various cultural messages (which are heterogeneous and rapidly changing in our times). On the other hand, these beliefs are a component of or group level environmental mentality. Our analysis will proceed in the framework of social representations theory, which encompasses both of these aspects. The aim of the article is to analyze the organizing principles and empirical types of environmental beliefs in an Estonian subpopulation. Theory of social representations The theory of social representations (Moscovici 2000, Flick 1998) deals with belief systems that are tied to certain social identities. Social representations are forms of knowledge (operationalized as attitudes, beliefs and practices) that are produced and sustained by certain groups or populations. Social representations (SR) are differentiated from similar concepts like individual or shared diffuse ideas. The following aspects have been highlighted: 1) SR are related to a specific group identity (Wagner, 1995) and therefore define not only the object but are also used for social self-definition of a subject; 2) SR are a structured set of ideas, systemic organization of thought content (not a loose aggregate of ideas); 3) SR are dynamic, variable and negotiable, they are the product of interaction and communication (vs. static and unquestionable character of collective representations and cultural beliefs); 4) differently from attitudes, SR are exteriorized and institutionalized, and can be studied also in the media, cultural artifacts, etc. In relation to an individual, social representations function as social resources and limitations, mediating social regulation and enabling self-positioning in the social space. In relation to a group, social representations function as means of communication and tools for constructing social objects. A social representation has often a simple and vivid form (e.g. metaphorical) in order to be easily communicable and easy to think with. We can differentiate between two general approaches in analyzing a SR: A widespread approach deals with SR as explicit content of thought. This approach focuses on within-group similarities in the content or structure of beliefs, emphasizing concrete and consensual aspects of SR. In this framework SR are surface phenomena, easily accessible tools for meaning-making and prediction in social interactions. Within such systems of knowledge it is possible to differentiate central elements (primary ideas, core beliefs, axioms, etc.), which generate and organize all the other elements of social representations. These primary beliefs are organized as a synthesis of oppositions (Moscovici & Vignaux 1994:68) which are anchored in pairs of opposing and interdependent notions. An alternative approach deals with SR as implicit organizing principles (structuring structure). These abstract underlying principles (categories, dimensions, reference points) reflect the regulative influence of the social metasystem on cognitive functioning and they organize symbolic relations between social agents (Doise 1994). According to these principles individuals or groups identify and differentiate themselves, choosing their relative positions within the representational field. Doise et al (1993:4) note that: More than consensual beliefs SR are (--) organizing principles, varied in nature, which do not necessarily consist of beliefs, as they may result in different or even opposed positions taken by individuals in relation to common reference points. …