Abstract
A general equilibrium model incorporating transactions costs and technological change is developed and used to investigate society's preference for the assignment of property rights affecting pollution. In contrast to the work of Coase, it is shown that indifference to the legal structure is a special case. Major results include (1) the specification of conditions under which society prefers polluters to pay for damages rather than allowing negative externalities to continue unless the polluters are bribed and (2) the conclusion that societies experiencing technological change eventually prefer the legal structure under which polluters pay for damages.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
