Environment and Common Property Institutions

Abstract

The twentieth century has witnessed many efforts to increase the sustainability of natural resource systems through reforms of property rights. The debate about the relative merits of government, private, and common-property regimes, however, has been clouded by three confusions. The article first clarifies the confusions between: (a) common-property (shared ownership rights) and open-access (no property) regimes; (b) common-pool resources and common-property regimes; and (c) resource systems and the flow of resource units from a resource system. Further, the concepts necessary to analyze diverse property rights systems are discussed including the rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and transfer. Once the conceptual framework is provided, the entry examines the question of whether those who own the rights of access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion (proprietors) but do not own the right of transfer are effective managers of common-pool resources. Empirical studies support the capabilities of proprietors to manage resources sustainably. Consensus among scholars has now been achieved regarding the attributes of a resource system and of the users of that system that enhance the likelihood of proprietors to invest time and energy devising and adapting rules that enhance the performance of their management system over time.