Abstract
This paper extends the tax competition analysis of public inputs to the case where the number of regions that compete for business investment is endogenous. To determine the number of competing regions, a fixed cost of regional development is introduced into the Zodrow–Mieszkowski model of public-input provision. It is shown that allowing for region entry does not affect the analytical results of inefficient public-input provision under tax competition. This paper also shows that the equilibrium number of competing regions is inefficient.
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