Abstract

Sets out a version of a standard conjectural‐variations oligopoly model, and investigates the properties of that model with respect to the effects of entry. Shows within this context that entry unambiguously reduces incumbents′ margins and output, while raising industry output. Also shows that higher degrees of collusion in an industry may induce entry at increased levels of output.

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