Abstract
The essay aims to analyze the developments of the Theory of Action with reference to the analysis of the sub-intentional roots of subjective rationality. The focus is on the attention that many authors - after Gilbert Ryle - have devoted to indeterministic, substantially entropic, properties which, in certain conditions, dominate the dynamics of mental life and on which the acratic dimension depends, compromising every design of rationality teleological, coherency and reliable judgment. From a thematic-disciplinary point of view, the extrinsic purpose of the analysis is, on one hand, to outline the conditions of a specific and indispensable inter-functional relationship between the sociological categories and the categories of cognitive psychology, and on the other to advance ar gued reservations about the admissibility of the autonomistic principle of an ecology of the mind.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have