Abstract
In this article, we present new data on electoral alliances (coligacoes) that were formed to contest Brazilian general elections between 1986 and 2014. We present evidence to show that alliances formed for gubernatorial and lower house elections are connected to one another. These joint alliances are part of complex coordination strategies for managing the entry and withdrawal of candidates for concomitant elections regulated by different rules. As we shall show, these joint strategies result in: 01. interlinked processes of party concentration in subnational executive elections, and party fragmentation in national lower-house elections; which is the result of 02. the emergence of political parties that specialize in contesting elections for different political offices.
Highlights
In this article, we present new data on electoral alliances that were formed to contest Brazilian general elections between 1986 and 2014
We show that electoral alliances for state governor and for the House of Representatives (HR) express complementary aspects of a same coordination process of entries and withdrawals in concomitant electoral contests conducted according to different principles
Research on alliances for other of ices has grown, including research that links alliances formed for different types of of ice (BORGES and LLOYD, 2016; CARREIRAO and NASCIMENTO, 2010; DANTAS, 2007; KRAUSE and GODOI, 2010; MIRANDA, 2013; SOARES, 2013)
Summary
We present new data on electoral alliances (coligaçõ es) that were formed to contest Brazilian general elections between 1986 and 2014. For each year-state-party, we identi ied the type of electoral entry in the gubernatorial election (e.g. head or member of alliance, solo candidate).
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