Abstract

We address the ethics of scenarios in which one party (the ‘agent’) entraps, intentionally tempts or intentionally tests the virtue of another (the ‘target’). We classify, in a new manner, three distinct types of acts that are of concern, namely acts of entrapment, of (mere) intentional temptation and of (mere) virtue testing. Our classification is, for each kind of scenario, of itself neutral concerning the question whether the agent acts permissibly (and concerning the extent to which the target is culpable). We explain why acts of entrapment are more ethically objectionable than like acts of (mere) intentional temptation and why these, in turn, are more ethically objectionable than like acts of (mere) virtue testing. Along the way, we scrutinize, and eventually reject, the view that acts of entrapment are ethically unacceptable because intentional temptation is involved in entrapment. (The article touches upon, but is not about, the question of culpability.)

Highlights

  • Cases of entrapment involve a party that intends to entrap, whom we call the ‘agent’, and a party that is entrapped, whom we call the ‘target’

  • In this article we focus on the ethics of entrapment, temptation and virtue testing

  • To sum up: in the scenarios of virtue testing, of intentional temptation and of entrapment that are of present interest, a common element is the intentional presentation to the target, by the agent, of the opportunity to perform an act that the agent considers impermissible

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Summary

Introduction

Cases of entrapment involve a party that intends to entrap, whom we call the ‘agent’, and a party that is entrapped, whom we call the ‘target’. While there are cases of entrapment in which the agent succeeds in tempting the target, there are cases in which the agent does not intend to tempt, and cases in which, while the target performs the impermissible act, it would be incorrect to describe the target as having been tempted (as against merely motivated) to perform it This significantly limits the scope of the objection from temptation, both in the form given by Hughes (2004) and in the simpler form arrived at in the course of our critique of his position.

Conceptual background
The objection from temptation
Entrapment is impermissible
The purist principle and the objection from intention
The objection from moral alliance
On the morality of virtue testing and mere temptation
Conclusion
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