Abstract

The essay argues for a concept of absolute truth as a cognitive claim to validity and for the relativity of normative conventions in practical dealings with truth. In opposition to the idea of an absolute imperative to truthfulness, it advocates a relative moral legitimacy of lying. Ritualized public scandals about people lying are often not an expression of honest outrage, but rather serve as an untruthful affirmation of norms about dealing with truth, the social validity of which has already become questionable.

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