Entanglement-distillation attack on continuous-variable quantum key distribution in a turbulent atmospheric channel

Abstract

The survival of Gaussian quantum states in a turbulent atmospheric channel is of crucial importance in free-space continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD), in which the transmission coefficient will fluctuate in time, thus resulting in non-Gaussian quantum states. Different from quantum hacking of the imperfections of practical devices, here we propose a different type of attack by exploiting the security loopholes that occur in a real lossy channel. Under a turbulent atmospheric environment, the Gaussian states are inevitably afflicted by decoherence, which would cause a degradation of the transmitted entanglement. Therefore, an eavesdropper can perform an intercept-resend attack by applying an entanglement-distillation operation on the transmitted non-Gaussian mixed states, which allows the eavesdropper to bias the estimation of the parameters and renders the final keys shared between the legitimate parties insecure. Our proposal highlights the practical CV QKD vulnerabilities with free-space quantum channels, including the satellite-to-earth links, ground-to-ground links, and a link from moving objects to ground stations.