Ensuring Data Storage Security in Tree cast Routing Architecture for Sensor Networks

Abstract

In this paper presents recent advances in technology have made low‐cost, low‐power wireless sensors with efficient energy consumption. A network of such nodes can coordinate among themselves for distributed sensing and processing of certain data. For which, we propose an architecture to provide a stateless solution in sensor networks for efficient routing in wireless sensor networks. This type of architecture is known as Tree Cast. We propose a unique method of address allocation, building up multiple disjoint trees which are geographically inter‐twined and rooted at the data sink. Using these trees, routing messages to and from the sink node without maintaining any routing state in the sensor nodes is possible. In contrast to traditional solutions, where the IT services are under proper physical, logical and personnel controls, this routing architecture moves the application software and databases to the large data centers, where the management of the data and services may not be fully trustworthy. This unique attribute, however, poses many new security challenges which have not been well understood. In this paper, we focus on data storage security, which has always been an important aspect of quality of service. To ensure the correctness of users’ data in this architecture, we propose an effective and flexible distributed scheme with two salient features, opposing to its predecessors. By utilizing the homomorphic token with distributed verification of erasure‐coded data, our scheme achieves the integration of storage correctness insurance and data error localization, i.e., the identification of misbehaving server(s). Unlike most prior works, the new scheme further supports secure and efficient dynamic operations on data blocks, including: data update, delete and append. Extensive security and performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is highly efficient and resilient against Byzantine failure, malicious data modification attack, and even server colluding attacks.