Enshrouding Of Pin From Snooping Using Steganopin And BW Method

Abstract

Now a daysUsers typically reuse the same personalized identification number (PIN) for multiple times. Direct PIN entries are highly dangerous for shoulder surfing attackers can effectively observe PIN entry with hidden cameras. Indirect PIN entry methods proposed as countermeasures are rarely deployed because they demand a heavier brain stuff workload for users. To achieve security and usability, we present a practical indirect PIN entry method called SteganoPIN. The human–machine interface of SteganoPIN is two numeric keypads, one which is covered and the other open, designed mainly to block shoulder-surfing attacks. After locating a long-term PIN in the more typical layout ,through the covered permuted keypad, a user generates a one-time PIN that can safely be entered in plain view of attackers. Forty-eight participants were involved in investigating the PIN entry time and error rate of SteganoPIN. Our experimental manipulation used a within-subject factorial design with two independent variables: PIN entry system (standardPIN, SteganoPIN) and PIN type (system-chosen PIN, user-chosen PIN).The PIN entry time in SteganoPIN (5.4–5.7 s) was slower but acceptable, and the error rate (0–2.1%) was not significantly different from that of the standard PIN.