Ennoia and dunamis antithetike: The Plasticity of the Skeptical Ability

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter is devoted to the notion of a skeptical ability. Though skepticism is characterized by an ability (PH 1.8) and the skeptic is the person who has this ability (PH 1.11), the idea of a skeptical ability is restricted to philosophical investigation. The skeptical way of reasoning leads the Pyrrhonist to suspension of judgment by exercising his ability under the direction of the main principle. Some scholars claim that this ability is basically a reactive capacity to counterattack what has been put forward by dogmatists. Arguing against this view, I propose that the skeptical ability consists in the capacity of actively arguing on both sides of an opposition. The abilities required to argue more dogmatically on the positive side are different from the abilities required to argue more skeptically or aporetically on the negative side. Simply put: whereas in the positive or dogmatic side of the opposition, the abilities required are the capacity to interpret and use arguments already available, the chief abilities in the negative or skeptical side of the opposition are to invent new arguments by applying some patterns and combining them in a persuasive counterattack. What is important to my interpretation is that we realize how many things one must do in order to be a (good) skeptic.KeywordsAbilityOppositionDogmatic argumentsSkeptical argumentsArgumentative patternsModes of suspensionSkeptical counterattack