Abstract
The long-term evolution (LTE) is the newly adopted technology to offer enhanced capacity and coverage for current mobility networks, which experience a constant traffic increase and skyrocketing bandwidth demands. This new cellular communication system, built upon a redesigned physical layer and based on an orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) modulation, features robust performance in challenging multipath environments and substantially improves the performance of the wireless channel in terms of bits per second per Hertz (bps/Hz). Nevertheless, as all wireless systems, LTE is vulnerable to radio jamming attacks. Such threats have security implications especially in the case of next-generation emergency response communication systems based on LTE technologies. This proof of concept paper overviews a series of new effective attacks (smart jamming) that extend the range and effectiveness of basic radio jamming. Based on these new threats, a series of new potential security research directions are introduced, aiming to enhance the resiliency of LTE networks against such attacks. A spread-spectrum modulation of the main downlink broadcast channels is combined with a scrambling of the radio resource allocation of the uplink control channels and an advanced system information message encryption scheme. Despite the challenging implementation on commercial networks, which would require inclusion of these solutions in future releases of the LTE standard, the security solutions could strongly enhance the security of LTE-based national emergency response communication systems.
Highlights
As mobile phones steadily become more powerful and bandwidth demands skyrocket, cellular operators are rapidly deploying broadband data services and infrastructure to enhance capacity
We introduce a set of security research directions at the PHY layer of long-term evolution (LTE) networks, aiming to enhance the resiliency of data communications against jamming
6 Conclusions Jamming attacks are one of the main types of security attack that mobility networks face. This threat is inherent to the actual wireless technology employed in this type of network, and in its most basic implementation, there is no means to prevent an attacker from broadcasting a high power interfering signal on a commercial frequency band
Summary
As mobile phones steadily become more powerful and bandwidth demands skyrocket, cellular operators are rapidly deploying broadband data services and infrastructure to enhance capacity. The proposed theoretical security system is based on an enhancement of the resiliency against radio jamming of the PBCH by means of a spread spectrum transmission This can be combined with scrambling of the PRB allocation of UL control channels and a distributed encryption scheme for downlink control broadcast messages. It would not be backwards compatible with current LTE terminals unless the PBCH and broadcasting messages were transmitted both within the central subcarriers and with the spread spectrum enhancement This solution is feasible and could be implemented in the context of an anti-jamming security-enhanced LTE-based military or tactical network, which would use custom wireless devices and eNodeBs. 4.2 LTE, MIB, and SIB message encryption As introduced in Subsection 2.2, the MIB and SIB messages broadcasted by an eNodeB contain essential network configuration parameters that aid the UE to synchronize and establish a connection with the network. A potential application for security-demanding military and first responder LTE-based networks could be implemented using nonstandard hardware on both transmitting and receiving sides
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